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STREAMLINING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN
MAGISTRATE COURT*
ROBERT BATEY** AND DIANA L. FULLER***
I. INTRODUCTION
Two recent developments have turned the attention of West
Virginia's criminal law community to magistrate courts. In March
1976, the state legislature reconstituted these courts,' expanding
their criminal jurisdiction to include the trial of all misdemeanors.2
Just three months later, the United States Supreme Court consid-
ered the constitutionality of the expedited procedures characteris-
tic of lower-level courts. In Ludwig v. Massachusetts,3 the Court
held that Massachusetts' ban on jury trials in district court-that
state's analogue to West Virginia's magistrate court 4-was consti-
tutionally permissible so long as defendants convicted in district
court were entitled to trial de novo in a higher court where the right
to trial by jury applied.' The decision in Ludwig came two days
after the Court decided a similar question in North v. Russell.'
* This article developed from work done for the West Virginia Magistrate
Training program, a project of the American Academy of Judicial Education. The
Academy bears no responsibility for any of the reforms proposed in the article.
** Assistant professor, West Virginia University College of Law; B.A., Yale
University; J.D., University of Virginia; LL.M., University of Illinois.
*** Class of 1977, West Virginia University College of Law; B.S., West Vir-
ginia University.
Act of March 13, 1976, ch. 33, § § 50-1-1 to -6-2, [1976] W. Va. Acts 189,
amending W. VA. CODE ANN. § § 50-1-1 to -20-6 (1976 Replacement Volume) (codi-
fied at W. VA. CODE ANN. § § 50-1-1 to -6-2 (Cum. Supp. 1976)).
2 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-2-3 (Cum,. Supp. 1976).
3 427 U.S. 618 (1976).
A district court in Massachusetts has jurisdiction over municipal ordinance
violations, all misdemeanors (except criminal libel), all felonies punishable by not
more than five years' imprisonment, and certain felonies with potential sentences
of more than five years. Id. at 620. For the criminal jurisdiction of magistrate courts
see W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-2-3 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
427 U.S. at 625-26.
d 427 U.S. 328 (1976). In North, the Court approved a conviction before a police
1
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Both Ludwig and North alluded to the efficiency of these lower-
level courts,7 and North quoted approvingly8 from an earlier Su-
preme Court pronouncement that "these courts are designed...
to provide speedier and less costly adjudications than may be pos-
sible in . . .courts . . .where the full range of constitutional
guarantees is available."' Thus, in these cases the Court approved
the notion that constitutional rights may be curtailed in lower-
level courts in order to achieve more efficient proceedings if the
defendant can regain his rights on trial de novo.
Ludwig and North give states like West Virginia the opportun-
ity to streamline lower-level court proceedings. The statute reor-
ganizing West Virginia's magistrate courts provides an excellent
means for taking advantage of this opportunity: the power to pro-
mulgate supervisory rules which the statute vests in the West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court of Appeals.'" This article suggests a number
of ways in which the court's rulemaking power can be exercised to
make magistrate courts more efficient. It first examines Ludwig in
detail, concentrating particularly upon the requirement that the
defendant have easy access to a court where all constitutional
rights are observed. The second section of the article recommends
changes in magistrate court procedure which would assure that
this requirement is met. The final section suggests how to take
advantage of having met this requirement; a series of procedural
reforms is proposed, each of which seeks to make criminal trials
in magistrate court more efficient.
II. LUDWIG V. MASSACHUSETTS
Richard Ludwig was charged in the District Court of Northern
Norfolk, Massachusetts, a lower-level criminal court, with the
crime of negligently operating a motor vehicle so as to endanger the
lives and safety of the public." Since his alleged offense was pun-
ishable by as much as two years' imprisonment," Ludwig de-
court judge who had had no legal education. The availability of trial de novo before
a law-trained judge apparently was determinative. Id. at 333-38. But see note 15
infra.
- 427 U.S. at 628-29; 427 U.S. at 335.36.
427 U.S. at 336.
Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 114 (1972).
'0 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-1-16 (Cum. Supp. 1976). This authority supplements
the court's general power to promulgate rules. W. VA. CONST. art. 8, § 3.
,I 427 U.S. at 622-23.
,2 MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 90, § 24(2)(a) (Supp. 1977).
[Vol. 79
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manded a jury trial, basing his claim on Duncan v. Louisiana.'3 In
Duncan, the Court held that "a crime punishable by two years in
prison is . . . a serious crime and not a petty offense. Conse-
quently, appellant was entitled to a jury trial. . . ."" The district
court denied Ludwig's motion and thus squarely raised the ques-
tion of the applicability of constitutional rights in lower-level crim-
inal courts. This was the question which the Supreme Court ad-
dressed in Ludwig v. Massachusetts.'"
In writing the majority opinion of the Court, Justice Black-
mun first described Massachusetts' "two-tier system of trial courts
for criminal cases,"' 6 comparing it with the systems used in other
states having upper- and lower-level criminal courts. The common
feature which defines these systems is the availability of a trial de
novo in the second tier of the court system after conviction in the
first tier.'7 The systems differ, however, in their provisions regard-
ing the availability of trial by jury.
Some States provide a jury trial in each tier; others provide a
jury only in the second tier but allow an accused to bypass the
first; and still others, like Massachusetts, do not allow an ac-
,3 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
" Id. at 162.
Is In this context, North v. Russell, discussed at note 6 supra, is less edifying
than Ludwig for two main reasons. (1) Unlike Ludwig, North did not consider the
applicability to lower-level criminal courts of settled constitutional doctrine. While
Ludwig could rely on Duncan in asserting his claim to a jury trial, North had no
Supreme Court precedent which directly supported his claim to a law-trained
judge. (2) When compared with Justice Blackmun's majority opinion in Ludwig,
Chief Justice Burger's opinion in North is curiously oblique. In the section which
considered North's due process claim, 427 U.S. at 333-38, the Chief Justice dis-
cussed that claim without precisely indicating the holding of the Court. In addition
to this relative defect in the majoity opinion, North is marred by Justice Stevens'
inability to participate and by Justice Brennan's unexplained concurrence in the
result. All nine justices subscribed to at least one of the three opinions in Ludwig.
" 427 U.S. at 620.
" In Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972), the Court described these sys-
tems in the following manner:
The right to a new trial is absolute. A defendant need not allege error in
the inferior court proceeding. If he seeks a new trial, . . . the slate [is]
wiped clean. Prosecution and defense begin anew. By the same token
neither the judge nor jury ... is in any way bound in the inferior court's
findings or judgment. The case is to be regarded exactly as if it had been
brought there in the first instance. (citation omitted)
Id. at 113.
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cused to avoid a trial of some sort at the first tier before he
obtains a trial by jury at the second.'8
Although Massachusetts does not formally allow a bypass of its
lower-level courts," Justice Blackmun was quick to note the exist-
ence of "an established, informal procedure known as 'admitting
sufficient findings of fact.' ",20 By this procedure, the defendant can
avoid protracted fact-finding in the lower-level court. After such
an admission, the judge of the lower-level court hears evidence
until he is convinced of the existence of probable cause and then
finds the defendant guilty. The defendant may appeal this verdict
and obtain a trial de novo.
2 '
Justice Blackmun's extended description of this informal by-
pass method implies that its existence was significant to the Court,
an implication borne out in a subsequent section of the majority
opinion. After briefly describing the series of events which brought
Ludwig to the United States Supreme Court, 2  Justice Blackmun
turned his attention to Ludwig's trial-by-jury claim, separating the
argument into two distinct contentions: (1) jury trials are constitu-
tionally required in lower-level criminal courts; and (2) even if jury
trials are not required in these courts, the Constitution at least
prohibits burdens on defendants' access to courts where trials by
jury are available-burdens such as cost, in both time and money,
of juryless lower-level criminal court trials.
The majority opinion rejected Ludwig's first contention with
ease:
It is indisputable that the Massachusetts two-tier system does
afford an accused. . . the absolute right to have his guilt deter-
mined by a jury composed and operating in accordance with the
Constitution. [The jury serves its function of protecting
against prosecutorial and judicial misconduct. . . at the sec-
ond tier of the Massachusetts system. . . .
Because trial by jury was available to Ludwig in Massachusetts'
upper-level courts, the Constitution did not require that it also be
,1 427 U.S. at 620.
'1 A guilty plea, the customary bypass vehicle in other states, bars trial de novo
in Massachusetts. Id. at 620-21.
21 Id. at 621.
21 Id.
2 Id. at 622-24.
2 Id. at 625-26.
[Vol. 79
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available in that state's lower-level courts.4 But allowing deferral
of the defendant's right to a jury trial also allows a chilling of the
exercise of that right during the period of deferral. This was the
thrust of Ludwig's second contention, to which the Court gave a
more elaborate response.
The majority opinion noted three ways in which delaying the
defendant's right to trial by jury might chill his ultimate exercise
of that right.n First, the defendant might not be able to afford two
trials. After the juryless trial in the lower-level court, such a defen-
dant might be financially incapable of exercising his right to a jury
trial. Second, the defendant might not be able to withstand the
"phychological and physical hardships" 6 of two trials and might
therefore waive his right to another trial even if it constitutes his
first opportunity to present his case to a jury. Third, the defendant
might fear a harsher sentence as a result of the later trial and
forego his right to trial de novo before a jury for that reason.
In considering the first two possibilities,2 Justice Blackmun
admitted that the burdens imposed by a trial in the lower-level
court are "not unreal and. . . may, in an individual case, impose
a hardship."2 However, these possible burdens on the right to trial
by jury were not enough to invalidate the Massachusetts system
of upper- and lower-level courts. By taking advantage of the infor-
mal procedure for bypassing the lower-level court, a defendant can
largely avoid these burdens. Consequently, his right to trial by jury
1' The Court distinguished the seemingly contrary holding in Callan v. Wilson,
127 U.S. 540 (1888), on the ground that Callan assessed the constitutionality of a
two-tier system operating in the District of Columbia and was thus the product of
the guarantees of right to trial by jury in both article m of and the sixth amendment
to the United States Constitution. Since only the latter provision applies to the
states, Callan did not control the decision in Ludwig. 427 U.S. at 629-30. For a
further basis for distinction see note 34 infra. In a concurrence, Justice Powell
adhered to his view that the sixth amendment does not apply to the states. Accord-
ingly, he would have distinguished Callan because it interpreted the sixth amend-
ment, while Ludwig called for interpretation of the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. Id. at 632 (Powell, J., concurring opinion).
2 427 U.S. at 626.
26 Id.
27 By its own terms, this portion of the opinion considered only the first possi-
bility, that the juryless trial could burden financially the defendant who wishes to
exercise his right to trial by jury. Id. However, Justice Blackmun's analysis of this
potential burden applies equally as well to the possibility that the psychological
and physical burdens of the first trial will chill the defendant's right to a jury trial.
zN Id.
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is not infringed.29 In other words, as long as there exists a means
of escaping the financial, physical, and mental costs of the first
trial, deferring trial by jury until the second trial is not unconstitu-
tional. 0
With regard to the first two possibilities, the existence of the
procedure for admitting sufficient findings of facts was crucial.
That procedure was, however, irrelevant to the Court's considera-
tion of the third possibility-that fear of a greater sentence on
retrial will deter a defendant from exercising his right to a jury
trial. The majority opinion concluded that Colten v. Kentucky3
precluded consideration of this possibility. In Colten, the defen-
dant argued that fear of a greater sentence on trial de novo chilled
exercise of his right to appeal, but the Supreme Court disagreed.
"[T]he hazard of being penalized for seeking a new trial . ..
[does not inhere] in the trial de novo arrangement."3 2 Relying on
this and similar language in Colten, the Ludwig Court determined
that there was no hazard of being penalized for seeking a new trial
before a jury.33
In these ways, the Court denied all three of the burdens that
the Massachusetts two-tier system of trial courts arguably placed
on the right to trial by jury. It is clear, however, that if the informal
procedure for bypassing the lower-level courts had not existed, the
majority might well have considered the financial, physical, and
mental costs of the first trial impermissible infringements on the
right to a jury trial.34 Fortunately for Massachusetts, the informal
bypass procedure was available, and that state's conviction of
Ludwig was accordingly affirmed by the Supreme Court. 5
29 Id.
11 In this context, Justice Blackmun also observed that, were Massachusetts
to abandon its two-tier system of courts, defendants would probably have to wait
just as long as they now do to obtain jury trials. Id. at 629. Consequently, whatever
burden this delay imposes would not be relieved by striking down Massachusetts'
system of upper- and lower-level courts.
31 407 U.S. 104 (1972).
2 Id. at 116.
" 427 U.S. at 627.
3' Justice Blackmun underscored the importance of the procedure for admit-
ting sufficient findings of fact by mentioning its existence as another basis for
distinguishing Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888). See note 24 supra. Because
there was no similar procedure in the District of Columbia at the time Callan was
decided, the Callan Court's rejection of juryless trials in lower-level criminal courts
did not require a similar rejection in Ludwig. 427 U.S. at 630.
-" Affirmance followed the concluding section of the opinion, which considered
[Vol. 79
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Justice Blackmun's opinion was supported by only four other
members of the Court." The four dissenters expressed their views
in an opinion written by Justice Stevens.3 His dissent, like the
majority opinion, focused on the procedure for bypassing trial in
the lower-level court. Unlike Justice Blackmun, however, Justice
Stevens could not find that this procedure relieved the burdens
which the first trial imposed on the right to a jury. He would have
preferred a procedure by which the defendant could bypass all
proceedings in the lower-level court: "All of the legitimate benefits
of the two-tier system could be obtained by giving the defendant
the right to waive the first-tier trial completely."3
The dissent argued that the first trial may, in a number of
ways, deter exercise of the right to a second trial and, conse-
quently, chill the defendant's right to a trial by jury. Besides the
financial, physical, and emotional strain of two trials,3 there is the
fact that "[a] second trial of the same case is never the same as
the first."40 There is also the additional problem that "the right to
trial de novo by taking an immediate appeal [does not] make the
judge's guilty finding and sentence entirely meaningless."'" At the
second trial, the judge and even some of the jurors may know of
the previous adjudication of guilt, which knowledge will inevitably
color many of their determinations. While the procedure for admit-
ting sufficient findings of fact may ease some of these burdens on
the right to a jury trial, Justice Stevens was unwilling to hold that
the availability of this procedure relieved the defendant of all such
burdens. Consequently, he would have reversed the conviction."
Ludwig's claim that Massachusetts' two-tier system places a defendant twice in
jeopardy. 427 U.S. at 630-32. The Court found that the argument was "without
substance." Id. at 631.
' Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Powell, and Rehnquist joined the
opinion of the Court. Justice Powell also wrote a brief concurring opinion. See note
24 supra.
37 Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall concurred in the dissent. 427 U.S.
at 632 (Stevens, J., dissenting opinion).
U Id. at 634. The only purpose which Justice Stevens could attribute to the
requirement that a trial be held in the lower-level court is an illegitimate one, that
being "to discourage jury trials by placing a burden on the exercise of the constitu-
tional right." Id. at 635.
11 Id. at 634-35.
Id.
" Id. at 637.
' The dissent quoted extensively from Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888),
arguing that the existence of a precedent "so nearly in point," 427 U.S. at 634, was
7
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While the Court divided sharply over the adequacy of Massa-
chusetts' informal bypass procedure, all nine justices appeared to
agree that, within two-tier systems, all constitutional rights need
not be observed in the lower-level courts, as long as these rights
are accorded defendants in the upper-level courts and as long as
defendants can reach these upper-level courts with ease. The con-
troversy in Ludwig concerned whether Massachusetts provides the
easy access which the Constitution requires.
If states like West Virginia wish to make proceedings in their
lower-level criminal courts more efficient, Ludwig indicates that
they may suspend some of the defendant's procedural rights in
order to achieve this goal. Ludwig also indicates the prerequisite
for this suspension of procedural rights: the defendant's path to a
court where his constitutional rights will be observed must not be
a difficult one.
m. RIGHT OF REMOVAL AS THE PREFERRED BYPASS MECHANISM
Ludwig v. Massachusetts strongly implies that a convenient
means of avoiding trial in the lower-level criminal courts is a prere-
quisite for expediting procedures in these courts. If some of the
defendant's procedural rights are not to apply at the first tier, he
must be guaranteed relatively unfettered access to the second tier
of courts. It is clear that West Virginia does not provide such access
to defendants in magistrate court. Consequently, the first step
toward streamlining proceedings in magistrate court is granting
criminal defendants a right of removal to the circuit court.
Under current West Virginia law, there is no way for a defen-
dant in a misdemeanor prosecution to bypass trial in magistrate
court. Unlike parties in a civil suit,43 the criminal defendant has
no right of removal. He may not avoid a trial in magistrate court
by pleading guilty and then exercise his right to a trial de novo.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has repeatedly
stated that there is no right to appeal from a verdict rendered upon
a plea of guilty, even when the plea is entered in magistrate court
and the subsequent appeal is to the circuit court for a trial de
novo.44 Likewise, a West Virginia misdemeanor defendant may not
further reason for rejecting the arguments offered by Massachusetts. For the
Court's treatment of Callan see notes 24 and 34 supra.
4 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-4-8 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
14 Browsky v. Perdue, 105 W. Va. 527, 143 S.E. 304 (1928); State v. Stone, 101
[Vol. 79
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take advantage of an informal bypass procedure like the one ap-
proved in Ludwig. Such "an established, informal procedure"45
simply does not exist in West Virginia. Consequently, the defen-
dant in magistrate court must suffer a full trial in that court before
he is granted access to the circuit court.
It should be plain from even a cursory reading of Ludwig that
West Virginia thus fails to provide the easy avenue to its upper-
level courts which is the prerequisite for relaxing constitutional
requirements in its lower-level courts. The first trial's financial,
physical, and psychological burdens, which Justice Blackmun
characterized as "not unreal,"46 are just as likely to arise in West
Virginia as in Massachusetts; furthermore, in West Virginia there
is no informal bypass proceeding to mitigate these burdens. Thus,
it is highly unlikely that the United States Supreme Court would
approve any suspension of the procedural rights of a defendant in
West Virginia's magistrate court unless some change is- made in
the rules governing that defendant's access to circuit court.
This change can take any one of three different forms, each of
which satisfies the requirements of Ludwig: (1) West Virginia may
adopt an informal bypass procedure like the one used in Massa-
chusetts; (2) the state may alter its position with regard to guilty
pleas by allowing a defendant to obtain trial de novo in the circuit
court after pleading guilty before a magistrate; or (3) the state may
give a defendant in magistrate court the right to remove his prose-
cution to the circuit court before magistrate court proceedings
have commenced. Although any one of these changes is acceptable,
the last-granting defendants a right of removal-should be pre-
ferred.
The rules governing proceedings in magistrate court could be
revised to include a bypass procedure similar to Massachusetts'
"admitting sufficient findings of fact."47 This would, of course,
satisfy the requirements of Ludwig. However, the adequacy of this
procedure was sharply disputed in the Supreme Court, and the
switch of a single justice would have resulted in rejection of the
W. Va. 53, 131 S.E. 872 (1926); Nicely v. Butcher, 81 W. Va. 247, 94 S.E. 147 (1917).
The supreme court of appeals cited Nicely and Stone with approval as recently as
1965 in State ex rel. Wright v. Boles, 149 W. Va. 371, 141 S.E.2d 76 (1965).
427 U.S. at 621.
" Id. at 626. See note 27 supra.
See text accompanying note 19-21 supra.
9
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procedure. Discretion would thus seem to recommend the adoption
of a bypass mechanism less burdensome to the defendant.
Decreasing the burdens on the defendant, by allowing him to
dispense with the first trial completely, rather than partially,
would also decrease the burdens on the state, because it would
have only one trial to conduct. Since the state apparently loses
nothing by allowing complete avoidance of the first trial,48 permit-
ting a speedier bypass would serve the interests of both the defense
and the prosecution.
One way of permitting this speedier bypass is to honor the
defendant's right to trial de novo even after he has pleaded guilty
in magistrate court. Under such a rule, defendants could gain' ac-
cess to the circuit court far more quickly than they could under a
procedure like Massachusetts' "admitting sufficient findings of
fact." In Ludwig, Justice Blackmun attempted to justify the Mas-
sachusetts bypass procedure on the ground that it "achieves essen-
tially the same result"4 as a procedure allowing trial de novo after
a guilty plea. By using that justification, the majority in Ludwig
broadly implied that such a rule is more than acceptable as a
prerequisite to the suspension of procedural rights in lower-level
criminal courts. Thus, if West Virginia changed its rule regarding
the effect of a guilty plea on the right to trial de novo, 5 the require-
ments of Ludwig would be met.
There are, however, difficulties with adopting such a bypass
mechanism. First, there appears to be a deep division on the
United States Supreme Court regarding the constitutional ade-
quacy of such a rule. Not all of Justice Steven's arguments against
the Massachusetts procedure are blunted by adoption of a rule
allowing trial de novo after a guilty plea. The plea still leads to an
adjudication of guilt and to a sentence, either of which facts may
be known by, and have an influence upon, the judge or jury at the
0 During the oral arguments in Ludwig, counsel for Massachusetts was asked,
"What good is the first hearing to the State, where you know the man is going to
appeal ... ?" 427 U.S. at 634 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting opinion). Counsel offered
no justification for requiring the first hearing-"Well, in the situation that you
gave, . . . I would say the State really has no benefit . . . " Id.-and extended
reflection has failed to suggest any legitimate reason for the requirement. See note
38 supra.
, 427 U.S. at 621.
' See text accompanying note 44 supra.
[Vol. 79
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second trial.' Accordingly, the four dissenters in Ludwig would
probably prefer a bypass mechanism which did not require a plea,
a finding of guilt, and sentencing.2 Adopting a rule which condi-
tions easy access to the circuit court upon a plea of guilty in magis-
trate court runs the risk that these four will attract a fifth vote.
The second major difficulty with adopting such a rule is that
it requires that a substantial amount of court time be devoted to
proceedings which trial de novo will render pointless. The magis-
trate must follow the appropriate procedures for accepting a plea
of guilty and for sentencing. The former requires a determination
that the plea is voluntary and intelligent. 3 The West Virginia Su-
preme Court of Appeals has recently urged the implementation of
an elaborate process for plea acceptance in the hope that this
process would thwart subsequent collateral attacks. 4 Even mini-
mal adoption of this process in magistrate court would consume
many hours of court time, all of it wasted when the defendant
intends to appeal and obtain a trial de novo.
In addition to the time lost in accepting the plea, there is the
time consumed by sentencing. In many instances, the sentencing
discretion vested in the magistrate is considerable,55 making the
sentencing decision a difficult one. The time consumed in making
this decision will also be wasted if the defendant plans to appeal
and force a new trial.
Although allowing trial de novo after a guilty plea would be
an acceptable prerequisite for suspending some of the procedural
rights of magistrate court defendants, a bypass procedure even less
1, See text accompanying note 41 supra.
52 Dissenting for Justice Marshall and himself in North v. Russell, Justice
Stewart wrote:
In short, I cannot accept the suggestion that, as a prerequisite to a consti-
tutionally fair trial, a defendant must stand up in open court and inform
a judge that he is guilty when in fact he believes that he is not.
427 U.S. at 346 (Stewart, J., dissenting opinion).
53Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
5, Call v. McKenzie, 220 S.E.2d 665 (W. Va. 1975).
With regard to simple assault and battery, for example, no statute limits the
discretion of the sentencer, the former sentencing range having been repealed when
the legislature reconstituted the magistrate courts. Act of March 13, 1976, ch. 33,
[1976] W. Va. Acts 189, repealing W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-18-1 (1976 Replacement
Volume). The only remaining limit on sentencing discretion is the constitutional
protecton against cruel and unusual punishment. State v. Miller, 85 W. Va. 326,
102 S.E. 303 (1919).
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burdensome to these defendants should be preferred. By giving
misdemeanor defendants a right of removal to the circuit court,
exercisable at any time before trial," West Virginia would provide
access to its circuit courts in such a way as to satisfy any constitu-
tional critic. 7 Moreover, this bypass procedure would place few, if
any, administrative burdens on the state. No evidentiary showing
by the prosecution would be necessary; nor would any expenditure
of court time be needed beyond that required to notify the circuit
clerk that the prosecution had been removed.
The only significant argument which can be mounted against
giving misdemeanor defendants a right of removal is that such a
right would make access to the circuit court so easy that every
defendant would take advantage of it. This would, of course, over-
load the dockets of the circuit courts. The argument is not persu-
asive, however, because of the considerable advantages to the de-
fendant of remaining in magistrate court.
As the misdemeanor defendant decides whether or not to exer-
cise his right or removal, one factor he will consider is the relative
expense-in terms of both time and money-of defending himself
in circuit court. A major goal of the lower-level courts is to adjudi-
cate criminal charges more quickly and economically than upper-
level courts can. Lower-level courts are "courts of convenience,
[designed] to provide speedy and inexpensive means of disposi-
tion of charges of minor offenses."" For those defendants primar-
ily interested in resolving the charges against them with a mini-
mum of inconvenience," the option to remove their cases to the
m Any party in a civil suit in magistrate court who wishes to exercise his right
of removal must do so before trial. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-4-8 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
Adopting a similar limitation on the criminal defendant's right of removal would
prevent a defendant from wasting court time by exercising his right of removal
during the trial.
57 In his Ludwig dissent, Justice Stevens spoke highly of "giving the defendant
the right to waive the first-tier trial completely." 427 U.S. at 634 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting opinion).
" Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 117 (1972), quoting Colten v. Common-
wealth, 467 S.W.2d 374, 379 (Ky. 1971).
59 In North v. Russell, Chief Justice Burger offered further examples of the
advantages of being tried in a lower-level court: "[I]t is a convenience to those
charged to be tried in or near their own community, rather than travel to a distant
[upper-level] court . . . and to have the option . . . of a trial after regular
business hours." 427 U.S. at 336.
[Vol. 79
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circuit court will be unimportant, and, in these cases, the right of
removal will not be exercised.
Another major factor likely to be considered in the removal
decision is the increase in the possibility of acquittal which results
from remaining in magistrate court. A defendant who refuses to
exercise his right of removal even though he fully intends to seek
a trial de novo if convicted in the lower court thereby guarantees
himself "two opportunities to avoid conviction and secure an ac-
quittal."6 Since the prosecution must establish guilt twice under
this procedure, the probability of an acquittal is greater than it
would be if the case were removed to the circuit court before trial
in the magistrate court. Consequently, defendants interested in
maximizing their chances for acquittal will spurn the opportunity
to remove their cases to the circuit court.
Even if there is no realistic possibility of acquittal in the
lower-level court, a defendant may improve his chances for acquit-
tal in the upper-level court by using the first trial as a discovery
device. "Proceedings in the inferior court. . . offer a defendant the
opportunity to learn about the prosecution's case and, if he
chooses, he need not reveal his own."6 Remaining in magistrate
court can thus be a wise defense strategy even when acquittal in
that court is highly unlikely.
What the existence of these factors indicates is that, while
some misdemeanor defendants will remove their cases to circuit
court, many will not. Consequently, there will be no overburdening
of the circuit court dockets and, therefore, no good reason not to
give misdemeanor defendants a right of removal to the circuit
court.
Providing a right of removal to an upper-level court allows the
suspension of some of the defendant's constitutional rights in the
lower-level court. Because removal is one of the defendant's means
of access to a court where all his constitutional rights are honored,
the defendant must be fully informed of his right to remove.62 This
Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618, 632 (1976).
Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 118 (1972), quoted in North v. Russell,
427 U.S. 328, 336 (1976).
62 In North v. Russell, the Supreme Court spoke of the lower-level court's
"obligation to inform all convicted defendants. . . of their unconditional right to
a trial de novo." 427 U.S. at 335. Chief Justice Burger inferred this obligation from
the importance of trial de novo to the defendant who seeks access to a court where
13
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admonition should be a part of the general procedure for informing
a defendant of his rights, 3 which should occur when the defendant
first appears before the magistrate.
Because it is unrealistic to assume that an uncounseled defen-
dant will understand all the implications of his right of removal,
the defendant's right to the advice of an attorney at this stage of
the proceedings must be safeguarded. 4 Without a lawyer's assis-
tance, the defendant's right of removal would be virtually mean-
ingless. Fortunately, in West Virginia the right to counsel in magis-
trate court is statutorily guaranteed,65 making further protection
unnecessary.
As a prerequisite for streamlining magistrate court proceed-
ings by suspending some of the defendant's constitutional rights,
West Virginia should grant defendants in that court a right to
remove their cases to the circuit court. The West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals should create this right of removal by rule. Such
a rule should define the right to remove, declare when it is exercis-
able, and describe the procedure by which the defendant is in-
formed of this right. On this foundation, the supreme court of
appeals could erect a truly efficient magistrate court system.
IV. PROCEDURAL REFORMS TO PROMOTE EFFICIENCY
Once the prerequisite for streamlining magistrate court proce-
dure has been met, simplification can occur at every stage of the
criminal proceeding, from the defendant's initial appearance to
the imposition of the sentence. By suspending some of the defen-
dant's procedural rights, as well as some of the prosecution's, the
entire proceeding will be made far more efficient. The defendant
who remains in magistrate court because he desires an expeditious
resolution of the charges against him will see his wish fulfilled.
all constitutional rights are observed. Id. at 334-35. By the same reasoning, defen-
dants must be informed of the right of removal, since it, too, is a means of access
to a fully constitutional court.
13 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-1-6 (1977 Replacement Volume). Section 62-1-6 is
made applicable to misdemeanor prosecutions by W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-4-2 (Cum.
Supp. 1976).
11 The decisions in Ludwig and North indicated quite clearly that the right to
counsel is not one of the rights which may be suspended in the lower-level courts.
427 U.S. at 627; 427 U.S. at 335.
" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-4-3 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
- Id. § 50-1-16.
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Initial Appearance. When the defendant first appears before
the magistrate, the following three separate procedures are re-
quired under current law: (1) the magistrate must inform the de-
fendant of his rights;67 (2) the magistrate must set bail for the
defendant;" and (3) the magistrate must determine if the defen-
dant is validly in custody." While the process of informing the
defendant of his rights is too important to be expedited,70 the other
two procedures can and should be avoided. Standardizing the set-
ting of bail can achieve this avoidance.
A strong argument can be made for the proposition that a
criminal defendant has a constitutional right to an individualized
determination of bail.7 Thus, standardization through the use of
a schedule specifying particular amounts of bail for particular
crimes is constitutionally suspect. As a consequence, magistrates
must consider a number of circumstances before setting bail. 2 The
supreme court of appeals can end this waste of court time by
establishing a bail schedule applicable to all alleged misdemean-
ants who are to be tried in magistrate court.13 Under such a sche-
dule, setting bail for a defendant who chooses to remain in magis-
trate court would be little more than a clerical function. Defen-
dants preferring an individualized determination of bail could ob-
tain it simply by exercising their rights of removal to the circuit
court. The presence of the option to remove would satisfy any
constitutional right to an individualized determination of bail that
defendants might have.
The existence of such a schedule would simplify the setting of
bail. Furthermore, the contents of the schedule could be used to
streamline the process by which the magistrate judges the validity
of the defendant's being in custody. This judgment, which requires
,7 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-1-6 (1977 Replacement Volume).
' Id. § 62-1c-1.
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975). Gerstein v. Pugh does not require such
a determination when the defendant has been brought before the magistrate pur-
suant either to an arrest warrant or to an indictment. Id. at 116-17 nn.18 & 19.
' See text accompanying notes 62-63 supra.
, See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951); Ackies v. Purdy, 322 F. Supp. 38 (S.D.
Fla. 1970).
72 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-1C-3 (1977 Replacement Volume), requiring consid-
eration of "the seriousness of the offense charged, the previous criminal record of
the defendant, his financial ability, and the probability of his appearance" at trial.
" The schedule should not control the setting of bail for alleged felons or for
those alleged misdemeanants whose trials will be in circuit court.
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a determination of whether there was probable cause to arrest the
defendant,74 is necessary only when the defendant will remain in
custody after the initial appearance.75 Thus, the more often the
bail schedule requires that a defendant be released without the
posting of any bail, the more often the magistrate can avoid deter-
mining the validity of custody. This is only one of the advantages
of releasing defendants without requiring bail. After considering all
the advantages, the American Bar Association recommended re-
lease without bail as the preferred means of dealing with almost
all criminal defendants." Whether alleged felons should be re-
leased in this fashion should probably be judged on a case-by-case
basis,77 but there seems to be little danger in granting alleged mis-
demeanants the right to release without the posting of bail."
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals should promul-
gate rules allowing the release without bail of all magistrate court
defendants. This would obviate the need for a procedure to set bail
and for a procedure to determine the validity of custody; it would
greatly expedite the initial appearance. If the court is unwilling to
take this step, it should at least establish a bail schedule for defen-
dants in magistrate court. This would relieve magistrates of the
need to determine the amount of bail necessary in each case. A
procedure for judging whether there is probable cause to continue
the defendant's custody would still be necessay, but the bail-
determining portion of the initial appearance could be omitted,
thereby simplifying the hearing.
Procedure Before Trial. After his initial appearance before the
magistrate, the defendant may enter one or more of the following
motions: (1) he may object to the form of his prosecution by claim-
ing misjoinder of charges or misjoinder of defendants or both; (2)
he may object to the timing of his prosecution; or (3) he may assert
his discovery rights against the prosecution. These motions are
71 Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975).
I' d.
ABA STANDARDS, PRETRIAL RELEASE § 1.2(a) (Approved Draft 1968).
" See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-1C-4 (1977 Replacement Volume), providing for
such a case-by-case determination.
18 In some cases greater control over the defendant may be desirable. If the
prosecution is unwilling to press its case in circuit court-which would end the
relevance of the magistrate court bail schedule-then the appropriate means of
restraining the defendant is through the issuance of a peace bond. W. VA. CoDE
ANN. § § 62-10-1 to -4 (1977 Replacement Volume).
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highly technical, presenting questions to the magistrate which are
both difficult and time-consuming. By acting to simplify the
pretrial process in magistrate court, the supreme court of appeals
can avoid this waste of court time, thereby expediting proceedings
considerably.
Under current law, whenever two or more offenses or two or
more defendants are prosecuted in a single trial, the defense may
have grounds for an objection. When multiple charges are joined,
the defendant has a right to sever the trial of those charges if they
were not part of the same "continuous transaction.""9 When multi-
ple defendants are joined, any one of them has an absolute right
to sever his trial.80
The most efficient way to use magistrate court time is to re-
solve as many criminal charges as possible in a single trial. Since
the current law on joinder of offenses and parties frustrates this
use, the supreme court of appeals should exercise its rulemaking
power to change that law. Joining multiple charges against a single
magistrate court defendant should not be objectionable, as long as
all the joined charges allege only the commission of misdemeanors.
Similarly, joining multiple defendants should be permissible in
magistrate court if the cases against the defendants share common
elements of proof.8' Under these rules, the only objectionable join-
der would be the trial of two or more defendants on wholly unre-
lated charges. Any defendant dissatisfied with such liberal joinder
standards could escape them simply by exercising his right of re-
moval.
Along with complaining about the form of his prosecution, a
defendant may challenge the timing of his prosecution. He may
claim that trying him would violate the statute of limitations,
which requires that a misdemeanor prosecution begin within one
year of the commission of the alleged offense, 2 or he may claim a
violation of the three-term rule, which forbids trial if three or more
T' State v. Tabet, 136 W. Va. 239, 67 S.E.2d 326 (1951).
State ex rel. Zirk v. Muntzing, 146 W. Va. 349, 120 S.E.2d 260 (1961),
applying W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-3-8 (1977 Replacement Volume).
11 See ABA STANDARDS, JOINDER AND SEVERANCE § 1.2(c) (ii) (Approved Draft
1968), recommending a similar test for use in all criminal prosecutions.
"2 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-11-9 (1977 Replacement Volume). The only exception
to this rule allows petit larceny prosecutions to begin at any time up to three years
after the offense allegedly occurred. Id.
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circuit court terms have elapsed since the prosecution began.3
These superficially simple rules are complicated by the addition
of a number of factors which suspend their applications. The stat-
ute of limitations does not apply to any period during which the
defendant obstructs prosecution by leaving the state or otherwise
concealing himself. The three-term rule does not apply to any
term during which the defendant is insane, asks for a continuance,
escapes from jail, or fails to appear for trial; nor does it apply to
any term during which any witness is ill or kidnapped or to any
term in which the defendant's trial ends in a hung jury."
A great deal of court time can be consumed in deciding
whether there has been a suspension of either one of these time
limits and in determining the length of any such suspension. In
order to avoid this waste, the supreme court of appeals should
adopt rules which apply the statute of limitations and the three-
term rule to magistrate court prosecutions without any possibility
of suspension. This would greatly simplify the magistrate's in-
quiry, as a defendant's motion under either of these time limits
would require only a glance at a calendar for resolution. Extended
argument concerning the defendant's obstruction of the prosecu-
tion or his acquiescence in its delay or any other suspending cir-
cumstance would be irrelevant.86
In addition to his objections regarding the form and timing of
his prosecution, the defendant may assert his discovery rights be-
fore trial. Current law entitles the magistrate court defendant to a
bill of particulars setting forth in detail the essential elements of
the case against him," to any of his statements or any of his prop-
" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-3-21 (1977 Replacement Volume).
" See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-2-17 (1966), explicitly recognizing these suspen-
sions of the civil statute of limitations. There seems to be no good reason not to
read similar suspensions into the criminal statute.
" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-3-21 (1977 Replacement Volume).
" Unlike most of the other changes in current law recommended in this article,
this proposal disadvantages the prosecution. A misdemeanant who left the state
after his crime and then returned a year later could not be prosecuted under the
rules proposed, even though a conviction would be proper under current law. It is
important, therefore, to note that the prosecution also has a "right of removal."
Whenever the state is dissatisfied with the rules applicable in magistrate court, it
may elect to proceed against the defendant in circuit court. W. VA. CODE ANN. §
51-2-2 (1966).
" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-1B-1 (1977 Replacement Volume), giving the magis-
trate the power to require that the prosecution furnish a bill of particulars. When
[Vol. 79
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erty which is in the hands of the prosecution, 8 and to all exculpa-
tory evidence known to the prosecution. 9 Providing all this infor-
mation is often a difficult task for the prosecution, so proceedings
can be delayed first to allow the prosecution to prepare the infor-
mation and then to allow the defendant to examine it. Such delay
should be impermissible in a "court of convenience." The supreme
court of appeals should act to make these discovery rights inappli-
cable to magistrate court proceedings,90 thereby organizing dis-
covery in that court along more traditional lines.9 Under such a
scheme, those defendants who seek discovery can obtain it by re-
moving their cases to the circuit court. Thus, this reform in magis-
trate court procedure, like the recommended changes in the rules
governing joinder and the timing of prosecutons, can aid in the
streamlining of that procedure while substantially protecting the
procedural rights of defendants.
Jury Trials. The single factor which most complicates proce-
dure in magistrate court is the defendant's right to trial by jury.
Exercise of this right requires the expenditure of court time for the
selection of a jury and for the instructing of that jury. Besides these
delays before and after the presentation of evidence, the use of a
jury lengthens the time required to put on evidence. Because evi-
dentiary rules must be applied more strictly in jury trials (because
the danger of prejudice is greater than in bench trials), more time
is wasted on hearing and disposing of objections to the introduction
of evidence.
there is no other document giving the defendant notice of the charges against him,
the defendant's constitutional right to such notice would appear to make a bill of
particulars mandatory. W. VA. CONST. art. 3, § 14.
" While the authority to order access to defendant's statements and property
is discretionary, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-1B-2 (1977 Replacement Volume), the
supreme court of appeals has viewed denials of such access as constitutionally
suspect. State v. McArdle, 194 S.E.2d 174 (W. Va. 1973).
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
80 Perhaps the symbolic value of preserving the defendant's right to exculpa-
tory evidence in the hands of the prosecutor is reason enough for continuing this
form of discovery in magistrate court. However, the value is purely symbolic, since
the ethical obligations of the prosecutor require the production of any such evi-
dence. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DISCIPLINARY RuLE 7-103(B). In
any event, the defendant's rights to a bill of particulars and to his statements and
property in the prosecution's possession should be abrogated.
11 For a description and defense of the traditonal view of criminal discovery see
State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881 (1953).
11 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
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West Virginia could avoid these delays by following the exam-
ple of Massachusetts, which denies defendants in its lower-level
courts the right to trial by jury. 3 However, this simple step flies
in the face of a firm commitment in the West Virginia Constitution
to the right to trial by jury in all criminal cases." Since the legisla-
ture chose to honor this commitment in reconstituting the magis-
trate court, 5 it probably would be impolitic for the supreme court
of appeals to attempt to achieve a different result through the
exercise of its rulemaking power."
Short of outright abrogation of the right to a jury trial, there
are several steps which the supreme court of appeals could take to
simplify trials in magistrate court. The court could standardize the
procedures for selecting a jury and for giving the jury instructions.
Further, it could save some of the court time wasted in dealing
with evidentiary objections by regulating the relatonship between
magistrate and jury during the trial.
The supreme court of appeals should accept the legislature's
invitation to promulgate rules for the selection of magistrate court
jurors. 7 Without such rules, the magistrate must summon prospec-
tive jurors, remove those who are disqualified," and strike those
who are properly challenged for cause.9 The time consumed in this
process could be saved in part by applying the procedures for sum-
moning qualified circuit court jurors' 9 to the calling of magistrate
court jurors. This would centralize largely administrative func-
tions in administrative, rather than judicial, hands and thereby
lessen the burdens on the magistrate.
'" MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 2 (1968); id. § 18 (Supp. 1977).
" W. VA. CONST. art. 3, § 14, art. 8, § 10.
"5 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-5-8 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
" Although impolitic, this step would not be impossible. The West Virginia
Constitution gives the supreme court of appeals power to promulgate rules for
judicial proceedings. W. VA. CONST. art. 8, § 3. Such rules are not subject to
legislative revision. In re Mann, 151 W. Va. 644, 154 S.E.2d 860 (1967).
" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-5-8 (Cum. Supp. 1976), reading in part: "The selec.
tion and summoning of jurors shall be conducted in accordance with the rules and
regulations of the Supreme Court of Appeals."
" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 52-1-1 (Cum. Supp. 1976); id. § 52-1-2 (1966).
9 State v. Wilson, 207 S.E.2d 174 (W. Va. 1974), citing W. VA. CODE ANN. §
56-6-12 (1966).
'® W. VA. CODE ANN. § § 52-1-3 to -7 (1966, Cum. Supp. 1976). These sections
authorize the preparation by jury commissioners of a list of those qualified to be
jurors, the placing of each of these names in a jury box, and the selection of prospec-
tive jurors from that box. Id.
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While rules of this sort would relieve magistrates of the tasks
of summoning potential jurors and of striking those who are not
qualified, such rules cannot discharge the magistrate's responsibil-
ity to remove prospective jurors who are prejudiced. In order to
assure an impartial jury, under current law the magistrate must
permit both the prosecution and the defense to question all the
summoned jurors, must allow either side to put on evidence that
one or more of the jurors is prejudiced, and must hear argument
from both sides before deciding whether or not the potential juror
is actually prejudiced.'' The supreme court of appeals should act
to avoid this cumbersome inquiry by denying both the prosecution
and the defense the right to question potential jurors. Instead, the
magistrate should question the jury, 2 using pattern questions pro-
mulgated by the supreme court of appeals. At the conclusion of
such questioning, the prosecution and the defense could offer their
challenges for cause, which the magistrate should consider without
hearing any further evidence. After the magistrate rules on these
challenges, peremptory challenges should be exercised and the
trial begun.0 3
The use of pattern questions for exposing juror prejudice is
only one of the ways in which this technique can be used to stream-
line magistrate court procedure. Just as pattern questions can
speed the trial process immediately before the presentation of evi-
dence, pattern jury instructions can expedite the trial after all the
evidence has been presented. Without such instructions, the mag-
istrate can charge the jury only by soliciting potential instructions
from both the prosecution and the defense and by then sifting
through these submissions, choosing the ones that most accurately
state the law or substituting instructions of his own drafting that
0I State v. Wilson, 207 S.E.2d 174 (W. Va. 1974), citing W. VA. CODE ANN. §
56-6-12 (1966).
02 Federal judges have a similar power to conduct all questioning of prospec-
tive jurors. FED. R. CrIaM. P. 24(a).
'" A more extreme but more efficient alternative would be to dispose of both
sides' rights to challenge jurors for cause, relying instead on peremptory challenges
to remove the prejudiced. Under this alternative, questioning by the magistrate
would still be necessary (in order to allow informed use of the peremptory chal-
lenges), but argument over any individual juror could be avoided. However, the
same concern which forestalls ending jury trials in magistrate court warns against
abrogating the parties' rights to challenge jurors for cause. See text accompanying
notes 93-96 supra.
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propound the appropriate legal principles better than any of the
ones submitted."4
In order to prevent this vast expenditure of time and effort,
the supreme court of appeals should publish pattern jury instruc-
tions for every offense which can be prosecuted in magistrate
court.'0 1 When relevant, the use of these instuctions should be
mandatory, and no objection to their use other than upon grounds
of relevance should be permitted. This would avoid excessive
wrangling over the charge to the jury and speed the trial considera-
bly.
In additon to expediting the progress of jury trials before and
after the presentation of evidence, the supreme court of appeals
can also act to speed the presentation of that evidence to the
jury.' 0 Because putting on evidence generally leads to an objec-
tion, which usually requires an instruction to the jury to ignore
either the evidence or the objection, ' the supreme court of appeals
should authorize pattern instructions for this purpose as well. This
would expedite the presentation of evidence to some extent.
Under current law, such instructions will sometimes fail to
cure the prejudice done to the defendant by disclosing inadmissi-
ble evidence to the jury. When a curative instruction would be
ineffective, West Virginia law requires the declaration of a
mistrial.' 8 In order to avoid the delay occasioned by a mistrial, the
supreme court of appeals should by rule deny any magistrate the
authority to grant a mistrial at any time during the presentation
of evidence.'0 ' This would force the magistrate to rely on the pat-
tern instructions, thus minimizing delay, as well as the chance that
an improper declaration of a mistrial would bar further prosecu-
tion on double jeopardy grounds."' Any defendant fearful of this
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-6-19 (1966).
" The American Bar Association has recommended the formulation of pattern
instructions for use in all criminal trials. ABA STANDARDS, TMAL BY JURY § 4.6(a)
(Approved Draft 1968).
I" For ways of speeding the presentation of evidence in all magistrate court
trials see text accompanying notes 111-25 infra.
107 This is the accepted means of handling such situations in West Virginia.
State v. Arnold, 219 S.E.2d 922 (W. Va. 1975).
State v. Bennett, 203 S.E.2d 699 (W. Va. 1974).
'' The court should, however, preserve the magistrate's power to declare a
mistrial when there is a hung jury. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-3-7 (1966).
"I State ex rel. Brooks v. Worrell, 190 S.E.2d 474 (W. Va. 1972).
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ban on mistrials could dissipate its effect by exercising his right of
removal or his right to trial de novo.
Assuming the unavailability of the most efficient solution to
the problems raised in jury trials-doing away with the right to
trial by jury in magistrate court-there are nonetheless some steps
which the supreme court of appeals can take to simplify such
trials. Jury selection, jury instruction, and the relationship of the
magistrate and the jury during trial all can be regulated to achieve
more expeditious proceedings.
Rules of Evidence. One factor which lengthens the presenta-
tion of evidence in jury trials and bench trials alike is the complex-
ity of the applicable rules of evidence. This complexity makes
objections to the introduction of evidence easy to raise and hard
to resolve. In two crucial areas, hearsay and the application of the
fourth amendment's exclusionary rule, the supreme court of ap-
peals should simplify the controlling rules. The results would be
less time wasted on evidentiary disputes and much speedier trials.
The intricacies of the ban on hearsay evidence are notorious.",
The difficulty in defining hearsay and the many exceptions to the
ban on its use provide a number of opportunities for dilatory objec-
tions. Disposing of such objections can be a difficult task for a
magistrate, with the task's becoming even more difficult when
there is a jury present. The magistrate's effort is further compli-
cated by the fact that some, but not all, of the hearsay rules are
constitutionally required."'
In reconstituting the magistrate courts, the legislature specifi-
cally granted the supreme court of appeals the authority to adopt
special rules of evidence for magistrate court trials."' The court's
first exercise of this power should involve a simplification of the
hearsay rules. Two possible simplifications have been suggested:
(1) the set of exceptions to the ban on hearsay evidence could be
replaced with a single general exception that admits hearsay when
its probative value outweighs its potential prejudice, or (2) the
hearsay ban could be lifted entirely."'
"' For example, the Federal Rules of Evidence define hearsay in one section,
ban it in another, and then list two categories of exceptions to the ban, with 24
exceptions in one category and five in the other. FED. R. EviD. 801-04.
"I Compare Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), with Dutton v. Evans, 400
U.S 74 (1970).
" See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-5-1 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
"' FED. R. EVID. 801-06, Notes by Advisory Committee.
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While the first approach obviously taxes the magistrate's time
and intellect more than the second, this more difficult approach
does protect the factfinding process against the effects of grossly
prejudicial hearsay. When a jury is the trier of fact, the first ap-
proach would appear to be better. On the other hand, when the
trier of fact is a magistrate (who is, by training and experience, less
likely to be swayed by prejudicial evidence than a juror would be),
the second approach should be preferred."' The supreme court of
appeals should enact rules applying these reforms in the law of
hearsay to jury and nonjury trials, respectively.
The evidentiary rules which enforce the constitutional ban on
unreasonable searches and seizures are only slightly less complex
than the rules enforcing the hearsay ban. Whenever a defendant
claims that some of the evidence against him is the product of an
unreasonable search or seizure, under current law the magistrate
must first determine if a search or seizure occurred."' Then he
must decide whether that search or seizure was reasonable, either
because there was a valid warrant"7 or because one of the excep-
tions to the warrant requirement applied"' or because there was
valid consent. "' Finally, the magistrate must consider whether the
challenged evidence is subject to exclusion as the fruit of the un-
reasonable search or seizure.' 0 Resolving all these issues can con-
sume a great deal of court time.'2 '
,,5 If the supreme court of appeals chooses to end the right to jury trials in
magistrate court, the second approach to hearsay should be taken in all magistrate
court prosecutions. But see text accompanying notes 93-96 supra.
,, See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
17 See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969) (probable cause require-
ment); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (particularity requirement).
"I See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (felony arrest exception);
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (plain-view search exception);
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (automobile search exception); Chimel
v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest exception);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (stop and frisk exceptions).
,, See Schneckloth v. Bustamounte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
'2 See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
2, The expansion of the criminal jurisdiction of magistrate courts to include
all misdemeanors, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-2-3 (Cum. Supp. 1976), should greatly
increase the amount of court time devoted to search-and-seizure claims, since pos-
session of a controlled substance now falls within the magistrate's jurisdiction. See
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The purpose served by this expenditure of court time is the
deterrence of unconstitutional police conduct. Excluding the fruit
of an unreasonable search or seizure "compel[s] respect for the
constitutional guaranty . . .by removing the incentive to disre-
gard it." '2 In recent years, the Supreme Court has noted that this
purpose may be accomplished without requiring exclusion at every
stage of the criminal process.' s As long as the "incentive to disre-
gard" the fourth amendment has been adequately counteracted by
requiring exclusion at some stage, exclusion at all stages is not
mandatory.
If magistrate courts discontinued excluding the products of
unreasonable searches and seizures,' 4 there would still be an ade-
quate mechanism for deterring such searches and seizures. Since
the defendant could always remove his case to the circuit court,
where exclusion would still be required, no investigating police-
man-even one who knew he was investigating a misdemeanor,
knew that the misdemeanor prosecution would begin in magistrate
court, and knew that the exclusionary rule did not apply
there-would have an incentive to disregard the fourth amend-
ment.
The deterrence of unreasonable searches and seizures, thus,
does not require exclusion of the fruits of such searches and sei-
zures in magistrate court. Since exclusion wastes court time, the
supreme court of appeals should promulgate rules which deprive
magistrate court defendants of the right to suppress evidence
solely because it is the product of an unconstitutional search or
seizure.' When combined with the recommended changes in the
22 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961), quoting Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
'2 Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976) (habeas corpus proceeding); United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (grand jury proceeding).
I Exclusion is currently required in magistrate court by statute. W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 62-1A-6 (1977 Replacement Volume).
2"I No change is recommended with regard to the exclusion of confessions, see
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S, 436 (1966), or of pretrial identifications, see United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), since the exclusionary rules established in
these areas tend to simplify, rather than complicate, the necessary inquiries. That
is, it is generally easier to find that Miranda warnings were not given and to exclude
a confession on that basis, than it is to find that the probative value of a confession
given without warnings is outweighed by its potential prejudice to the defendant
and to exclude the confession for that reason. This balancing of probative value
against potential prejudice is necessitated by the presence of a jury. If the supreme
25
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hearsay rules, this repeal of the fourth amendment's exclusionary
rule should greatly simplify the law of evidence in magistrate
court, expediting proceedings in that court dramatically.
Sentencing. As noted elsewhere, even the sentencing proce-
dure in magistrate court can be time-consuming."6 Since magis-
trates now possess'2 a discretionary power to sentence almost as
broad as that of the circuit judges,' and since magistrates must
listen to convicted defendants (and their lawyers) before sentenc-
ing them, 129 the process of punishing the convicted can be quite
lengthy.
The supreme court of appeals should speed this process by
adopting a schedule of mandatory sentences for all misdemeanors
tried in magistrate court.'30 Such a schedule would eliminate the
magistrate's sentencing discretion, because the imposition of the
specified sentence would be automatic. Since the magistrate would
have no discretion to exercise, there would be no need to allow the
defendant or his attorney to address the court before sentence was
imposed.
This schedule of sentences should reflect a marked preference
court of appeals should abrogate the magistrate court defendant's right to a jury
trial, see text accompanying notes 93-96 supra, some reform in the application of
Miranda and Wade should then be considered. See text accompanying notes 114-
15 supra.
' See text accompanying note 55 supra.
"2 The statutory provision which formerly gave the magistrate court jury the
power to impose sentence is no longer in force. Act of March 13, 1976, ch. 33, [1976]
W. Va. Acts 189, repealing W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-18-7 (1976 Replacement Vol-
ume). Thus, only the magistrate may now pass sentence on a defendant convicted
in his court.
'l Unlike circuit court judges, magistrates may not place convicted defendants
on probation. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-12-1 (1977 Replacement Volume), granting
such authority to the circuit courts. However, the magistrate may use his authority
to place an individual under a peace bond, W. VA. CODE ANN. § § 62-10-1 to -4 (1977
Replacement Volume), as a form of probation.
' Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424 (1962), suggests that a defendant may
not be "affirmatively denied an opportunity to speak during the hearing at which
his sentence [is] imposed." Id. at 429. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967),
guarantees the defendant's right to counsel during sentencing.
' The sentencing schedule should not apply to misdemeanor prosecutions in
circuit court, where the judge should retain the power to select any one of range of
penalties. This will give both prosecution and defense a forum in which to seek a
sentence different from the one specified in the sentencing schedule.
[Vol. 79
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for punishment by fine as opposed to incarceration."' One way of
achieving this goal is by making all of the mandatory sentences
financial punishments as opposed to limitations on liberty. An-
other way would be to reserve incarceration for only the most seri-
ous misdemeanors. Under either approach, the magistrate should
also be granted the authority to place those convicted defendants
who are unable to pay their fines '32 on probation,'33 since they
cannot be jailed for their inability to pay.' 34
Sentencing, like many other stages of the criminal process in
magistrate court, can be streamlined, making that court a more
efficient forum for determining guilt or innocence. For the defen-
dant who prizes speed over the painstakingly careful procedure of
the circuit courts, the magistrate court can be a useful alternative.
V. CONCLUSION
Lower-level criminal courts can aim at one of two distinct
goals. They can attempt to provide the full set of constitutionally
required procedures which are available in the upper-level courts,
or they can seek to supply efficient means for the speedy resolution
of criminal charges. While commitment to the former goal com-
ports more with contemporary notions of due process, commitment
to the latter goal better conforms to reality. That is, streamlining
magistrate courts is a far more realistic goal than constitution-
alizing them.'5
'31 Such a preference is advocated in ABA STANDARDS, SENTENCING ALTERNA-
TIVES AND PROCEDURES § 2.3(c) (Approved Draft 1971).
"3 The defendant's status as an indigent for sentencing purposes should be
determined by the same process used in deciding whether counsel should be ap-
pointed for him. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-4-3 (Cum. Supp. 1976); id. § 59-2-1
(1966).
"I The sole condition of probation should be obedience of the law. If the defen-
dant violates this condition within the standard probationary period (perhaps one
year), the violation should cause the sentencing judge to impose a harsher penalty
for the second offense. This assumes that the second prosecution will occur in the
circuit court, where variation in sentencing is possible. The assumption is a reason-
able one, since the violation of probation is just as likely to cause the prosecutor to
seek a harsher penalty as it is to cause the judge to impose one.
'' Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971).
' No attempt has been made in this article to gauge the disparity between
the procedures currently required of magistrates and those procedures actually
observed in magistrate courts. However, the widespread impression that the dispar-
ity is monumental suggests that overcoming whatever gap there is would be diffi-
cult indeed.
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Perhaps this practical judgment about the limits of reform
motivated the decisions in Ludwig and North. Whatever its moti-
vations, the Supreme Court clearly chose efficiency and expedition
as the aims appropriate for a system of lower-level criminal courts.
West Virginia undoubtedly will accept this choice.13 It is hoped,
therefore, that this acceptance will take the form outlined in this
article.
'3 It is possible, and perhaps even desirable, for West Virginia to commit itself
to the goal of constitutionalizing its lower-level courts. However, without any impe-
tus from the federal courts, this possibility is highly remote.
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